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Abstract: This essay explores the nature and implications 
of John Finnis’s express negation in his work Natural Law 
and Natural Rights of the objective primacy of speculative 
truth with respect to the derivation of practical reason and 
agency. The essay observes two senses of the speculative/
practical distinction. One sense concerns whether the object 
known is a contingent matter ordered to an end or whether 
it concerns a universal, necessary, or eternal truth. The oth-
er sense concerns the mode of the knowledge itself: whether 
its end is simply knowledge, or whether the end is the good 
of an operation. Because prior to desire and intention all 
knowledge is speculative in its mode, and this knowledge 
is absolutely necessary for knowledge that is practical in its 
mode; and because knowledge that is practical in its mode 
is absolutely prior to knowledge that is practical merely in 
that it concerns a practical object – because without knowl-
edge practical in its mode there will never be such knowl-
edge that is practical in its object – it follows that practical 
reasoning is derivative of knowledge that is speculative in its 
mode. Implications of Finnis’s error – about teleology, com-
mon good, and God – are considered.
Keywords: unified normative teleology, speculative rea-
son, practical reason, incommensurability.
Resumen: En este ensayo se estudia la naturaleza e impli-
caciones de la negación de la primacía objetiva de la verdad 
especulativa sobre la razón práctica del agente, que John Fin-
nis recoge expresamente en su obra Ley Natural y Derechos 
Naturales. El trabajo considera dos planos de la distinción 
entre razón especulativa y razón práctica. Desde uno de ellos 
se observa si el objeto conocido por la razón es una materia 
contingente ordenada a un fin o, si, por el contrario, se trata 
de una verdad universal, necesaria o eterna. Desde el segun-
do sentido se atiende al modo operativo del razonamiento 
mismo: ya sea su fin el conocimiento en sí o el bien de una 
acción. Precisamente porque todo conocimiento previo al 
deseo y a la intención es ,modalmente, especulativo, siendo 
éste absolutamente necesario para el conocimiento prác-
tico, y porque el conocimiento práctico es absolutamente 
anterior al conocimiento práctico referido a un objeto prác-
tico –porque sin el conocimiento práctico no podría haber 
conocimiento práctico referido a un objeto–, se sigue que el 
razonamiento práctico deriva del modalmente especulativo. 
Se analizan las consecuencias del error de planteamiento en 
Finnis sobre la teleología, el bien común y Dios.
Palabras clave: teleología normativa unificada, razón es-
peculativa, razón práctica, inconmensurabilidad.
i. intRoDuCtion
T here is a very intriguing question as to which, of the differentiae dis-tinguishing John Finnis’s famed work Natural Law and Natural Rights 1 from the classical natural law teaching of Aquinas, constitutes the most 
pivotal. Several claimants to the throne exist. For example: the loss of unified 
1 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980.
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normative natural teleology constituted by the doctrine of the alleged incom-
mensurability of goods denominated as basic; the putative «premoral» rather 
than moral character of the primum princeptis legis of law grasped by the innate 
natural habitus of synderesis; the negation of the transcendence of the com-
mon good; the insistence that «natural law can be understood, assented to, 
applied, and reflectively analyzed without advertence to the existence of God» 
and negation of the theonomic character of natural law as essential to natural 
law; and the hazards of intentionalist construction of moral agency, might each 
be thought to constitute architectonic points of critical divergence 2. Each has 
catalyzed significant scholarly conversation and criticism since the initial pub-
lication of his work. Yet each of these seems in some measure to derive from 
the prior foundational judgment regarding the precepts of the natural law that:
«They are not inferred from speculative principles. They are not infe-
rred from facts. They are not inferred from metaphysical propositions about 
human nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about ‘the function 
of a human being,’ nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of 
human nature or any other conception of nature. They are not inferred or 
derived from anything. They are underived (though not innate)» 3.
The practical on this account is in no way derived from the specula-
tive. In Natural Law and Natural Rights, the nature of speculative and practical 
knowledge and their relation is regarded as, simpliciter, the distinction between 
«fact» and «norm» or between «is» and «ought» 4.
2 To name only a few works engaging various of these considerations see, for example, hittingeR, 
R., A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 
Indiana, 1987; mCineRny, R., Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Catholic 
University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1982; VeatCh, H., Swimming Against the Cur-
rent in Contemporary Philosophy: Occasional Essays and Papers, Catholic University of America Press, 
Washington D.C., 1990, especially the last two chapters, «Can John Finnis Bring Off a Revival of 
Natural Law» and «Natural Law and the ‘Is’-‘Ought’ Question: Queries to Finnis and Grisez»; 
and long, S., «St. Thomas Aquinas Through the Analytic Looking-Glass», The Thomist, vol. 
65, 2001, pp. 259-300; or «Natural Law or Autonomous Practical Reason: Problems for the New 
Natural Law Theory», pp, 165-196, ch. 6 of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition, 
Goyette, J. & Latkovic, M. (eds.), Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2004, 
pp. 165-193; «Critiques of the New Natural Law Theory», National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 
vol. 13, n. 1, Spring 2013, containing works by Fulvio di Blasi, Matthew B. O’Brien, Michael Pa-
kaluk, Edward Feser, Kevin L. Flannery, S.J., Steven A. Long, and John Goyette.
3 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 33.
4 Ibid., p. 36: «Since Aquinas’s Aristotelian distinction between ‘speculative’ and practical reason 
corresponds so neatly with the modern (but not only modern!) distinction which we (roughly!) 
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If we stress only the «not inferred» and construe this as a purely logical 
connection prescinding in its content from the unified teleological ordering 
of human nature, then of course there is clearly a sense in which the principles 
of the natural law are not inferred. Yet, there are ends, and if we acknowledge 
this, we do not deny that practical implications may ensue from originative-
ly speculative knowledge, e.g., the knowledge that good is to be done and 
pursued, and evil avoided, is as the first principle of law something that fol-
lows upon the teleologically effective ordering of human nature as such and is 
grasped per se nota by the mind. Yet per se nota does not simply mean «unde-
rived» – i.e., it is grasped per se nota by the mind given prior natural knowledge 
which human beings possess which is prior to and the condition of practical 
knowledge and agency – and the insight that this is so requires understanding 
what differentiates acts of the mind as such. The immediacy in question pre-
supposes a knowledge prior to practical action, prior to intention, and prior 
to desire, and so is rightly said to be «derived» from such prior knowledge, to 
flow from it, by reason of an innate natural habitus of synderesis.
One may sympathize with any author who must engage the difficulties 
that beset the relation of the speculative to the practical. In a sense, influential 
Thomistic authors of the twentieth century who might not have assented to 
Finnis’s formulation found themselves in a comparable difficulty in coping 
with the relation of prudence to synderesis, at times verging on asserting the 
priority of the former over the latter in ways that call into question the genu-
ine role of moral principle in moving and directing prudence itself 5. Such con-
indicate by contrasting ‘fact’ and ‘norm’ or ‘is’ and ‘ought’, it will be helpful to consider in greater 
depth the historical process by which the theory of natural law has come to be associated with a 
fundamental disregard of this distinction». Also p. 42, where he states that «the principle that 
ought is not inferable from is retains its validity».
5 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 47, a. 6, ad. 3. Latin of all citations from 
Thomas derived here and hereinafter from the Corpus Thomisticum, S.Thomae de Aquino opera 
omnia, made available online by the University of Navarre at www.unav.es/filosofia/alarcon/
amicis/ctopera.html#OM: «synderesis movet prudentiam». One significant Thomistic author 
of great merit whose inflections seem to me somewhat to minimize the role of principle vis-à-
vis prudence is Yves Simon. simon, Y., The Tradition of Natural Law Fordham University Press, 
New York, 1992, pp. 155-156, that «in regard to innumerable questions about the right and the 
wrong, the answer is not obtained by logical connection with principles» because the connec-
tion between «particular determinations» and universal norms «is not logical, it is prudential». 
Had he said: «the connection» is «not merely logical, but also prudential» this proposition argu-
ably would be closer to the mark. For consideration of the loss of the causality of synderesis vis-
à-vis  prudence, see forthcoming from Emmaus Press: bRaDy, R., Conforming to Right Reason: On 
the Ends of the Moral Virtues and the Roles of Prudence and Synderesis, in particular its third chapter. 
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siderations clearly reflect a diverse but real mode of at least partial deflection 
of the speculative foundations for practical reason that may be compared with 
the more universal and systematic negation found in Natural Law and Natural 
Rights. Yet while in Finnis’s work this negation is systematic, it insists upon the 
objectivity of moral truth, and a clearly stated intention to affirm speculative 
truths about nature and being (but only as something from which the practical 
is in no way derived) 6.
The denial that practical precepts are «derivable» from speculative truth 
– the view that to be per se nota indeed means to be underivable and underived – 
casts a long shadow over the ensuing development of Finnis’s account of the 
natural law, generating implications not found in the accounts even of those 
earlier Thomists who arguably inflected their account toward the concession 
of too great an independence of prudence from synderesis. In Natural Law and 
Natural Rights the totality of the negative judgment regarding «nonderivabil-
ity» is pressed with genuine intellectual rigor, and so there is a «purely prac-
tical reason» lacking epistemic foundation in speculative truth which to some 
authors has called to mind the work of Kant. However, one must observe that 
unlike Kant, in Finnis’s analysis there is a species of «nonunified» teleology, 
charmingly described by Russell Hittinger, in responding to Germain Grisez 
in regard to the same issue of putatively incommensurable goods, as «nature 
speaks with a forked tongue» 7 (although the analysis of incommensurability 
6 Thus, Finnis claims in Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 49, that natural law can be 
«understood, applied, or reflectively analyzed without adverting to the question of the existence 
of God» – which whatever one may say about it, is decidedly not the teaching of Aquinas, for 
whom there are natural law duties to God under the virtue of religion, for whom both the 
definition of the law requires reference to the eternal law, and from whom the reality of the law 
requires divine promulgation. Yet he also asserts that this superfluity of God to his conception 
of natural law «does not entail either that (i) no further explanation is required for the fact 
that there are objective standards of good and bad and principles of reasonableness (right and 
wrong), or (ii) that no such explanation is available, or (iii) that the existence and nature of God 
is not that explanation». He does not deny the reality of such a theistic account, but its essential 
role both formally and materially for natural law and for human practical reasoning and agency. 
The construction of his moral account is downstream from the epistemic negation of the foun-
dational role of speculative truth in the inception of practical reasoning.
7 hittingeR, R., A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory, op. cit., – the first and still in many 
respects the best of the critiques of what has become known as the New Natural Law Theory. 
See the comments on the Aztec human sacrifice and the putatively incommensurable goods of 
life and religion, pp. 111-112. He is here responding to Germain Grisez rather than Finnis but 
arguing similar points about the pertinence of speculative truth to the good of religion and ar-
guing contrary to the hypothesis that goods denominated as basic are incommensurable. He ar-
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contains a certain combination of deontological form with a nonunified tele-
ology of natural goods to which Kant could not have ascribed). Hittinger’s re-
mark strikes home, in that this doctrine cannot help implying a certain eclipse 
of the wider normativity of the unified teleological order impressed on things 
from creation such that in this respect Finnis’s analysis is in a narrow but deci-
sive zone comparable with the Kantian account. Nonetheless, by reason of the 
role of essentially disunified natural teleology 8, Finnis’s account of natural law 
is a work of moral theory new under the heavens, embracing aspects of natural 
good that Kant – perhaps more consistently, but to the impoverishment of the 
content of his moral account – abjured.
Adding to the difficulties besetting this aspect of the analysis found in 
Natural Law and Natural Rights is the fact that Thomas’s text, founded on 
Aristotle’s prior account, is far more complex than is customarily recognized. 
And this complexity is necessary; that is, it is required for an adequate ac-
count of the diverse senses of «practical» and «speculative» which terms apply 
differently when taken to refer to what our knowledge is about as distinct from 
referring to the character or mode of our intellectual activity itself.
I will first address the fundamentality of the distinction between the 
speculative and the practical, and their relation, as articulated in Thomas’s 
teaching – not of course for mere historical or pious motives, but because of 
its essential importance in clarifying the matter. I will attempt to explain at 
length the precise sense in which practical precepts are «derived» from prior 
speculative apprehensions and at times even «inferred» from them. In doing 
this, I will advert to the insights of Fr. Serge-Tomas Bonino, who makes ob-
servations that seem to me to crystallize a problem whose correct understand-
ing makes proper analysis of this distinction clear (although I differ with his 
gues that the Aztec religious practices of human sacrifice do not, given the incommensurability 
of life and religion, and on the account of incommensurable goods wherein the speculative truth 
of religion is held not to be pertinent to its being good, imply that these are not religious. Thus, 
he writes that it might be said that Grisez «has reserved moral grounds for objecting to such 
religious practices. For example, he might argue that these practices violate some other human 
good, such as life; but this moral judgment does not disqualify the rituals as the good of religion; 
it only indicates that this particular religious observance violates the good of morality by failing 
to respect other basic goods. In other words, the Aztecs, according to nature, participate in the 
good of religion, for they find their religious practices attractive and gratifying; yet the practices, 
according to natural moral norms, violate the eighth mode of responsibility. Nature appears to 
speak with a forked tongue».
8 Finnis famously argues that prior to choice there is no morally significant order among basic 
goods (Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 92-95).
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immediate resolution) and which seems to me to supply a sense for Finnis’s 
concerns that enriches the discussion 9. Secondly, I will try briefly to suggest 
how Finnis’s account of the relation between the speculative and the prac-
tical cascades into the further critically controversial aspects of his theory, 
indicating the strategic implications of Finnis’s view of the nonderivability of 
the practical from the speculative in engendering certain further problems 
regarding some of the points mentioned in my first paragraph above (i.e., re-
garding: the role of natural teleology; the genuinely moral character of the 
first precept of law; the transcendence of the common good; and the essential 
role of God in the natural law, i.e., its theonomic character). Finally, and in 
conclusion, I will offer a brief suggestion regarding how Finnis’s work should 
be understood in relation to the natural law tradition, and its importance in 
signaling the difficulties, profundity, and importance of natural law reasoning. 
It is my hope that this analysis will make clear that in reasoning so rigorously 
from his composite premises Finnis has provided the occasion for many minds 
to encounter some of the most difficult questions at the font of natural law, 
while yet the systemic difficulties implied by his account of the nonderivability 
of the practical from the speculative manifests the critical limitations of the 
thought experiment he has undertaken in its regard.
ii. the sPeCulatiVe anD the PRaCtiCal
As noted above, Finnis in Natural Law and Natural Rights (and other 
works) 10 holds that propositions about the «primary goods» are not derived 
«from any... propositions of speculative reason» 11. Indeed, speculative knowl-
edge of nature is viewed as wholly disjunct from practical reason. As Finnis 
puts it:
«From end to end of his ethical discourses, the primary categories for 
Aquinas are the ‘good’ and the ‘reasonable’; the ‘natural’ is, from the point 
9 I make no claim that Fr. Bonino concurs with my analysis, and indeed his conclusion appears 
to be different. Yet his remarks seem to me to make clear the decisive problem whose solution 
alone gives the right reading both of Thomas’s text, and of the essential difficulty of the matter. 
Hence, I am greatly indebted to his work on this subject.
10 Finnis, J., Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.
11 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 46.
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of view of his ethics, a speculative appendage added by way of metaphysical 
reflection, not a counter with which to advance either to or from the practi-
cal prima principia per se nota» 12.
We have already seen, above, Finnis’s insistence moral precepts «are not 
inferred or derived from anything. They are underived (though not innate)» 13. Ap-
plying this judgment to Thomas’s account of the threefold ordering of pre-
cepts following the order of inclinations (which implies the order of ends) 14, 
Finnis writes in Natural Law and Natural Rights:
«Are not speculative considerations intruding into a reconstruction of 
principles that are practical and that, being primary, indemonstrable, and 
self-evident, are not derivable (nor sought by Aquinas to be derived) from 
any speculative considerations?» 15.
Yet one may doubt that the terminology of «natural» law is added only as 
a speculative appendage 16. Thomas does not unilaterally equate the speculative 
exclusively with the «theoretical», nor identify some class of propositions in 
which the primacy of speculative adequation of mind to being is not precisely 
foundational in knowledge of the good. He teaches consistently that there are 
not two intellectual powers – one speculative, one practical – and that the dif-
ference between the speculative and practical intellect is accidental and hence 
does not alter the adequation to reality that attends knowledge as such. Thus 
St. Thomas in the following two quotations from the same article of the Sum-
ma Theologiae articulates, with precision, both the nature of, and the distinc-
tion between, the speculative and the practical:
12 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 36.
13 Ibid., p. 33.
14 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 2, «Secundum igitur ordinem inclina-
tionum naturalium, est ordo praeceptorum legis naturae». – «Thus according to the order of 
natural inclinations is the order of the precepts of the natural law».
15 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 94.
16 There are also questions as to whether, in Natural Law and Natural Rights, the legal character 
of natural law is sufficiently treated, as the issue of promulgation, and of the character of the 
natural law as law, seems to be set aside as something inessential to natural law. Yet, of course, 
for Thomas, law is promulgated; and the one who promulgates the natural law which is (as is 
said in Summa Theologiae, I-II, op. cit., q. 91, a. 2, «nothing other than the rational participation 
of the eternal law» – meaning, if there is no eternal law, there is no natural law) God (Summa 
Theologiae, I-II, op. cit., q. 90, a. 4, ad. 1).
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«Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether 
it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and 
practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what 
it apprehends, not to operation, but solely to the consideration of truth; while 
the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation 17.
The object of the practical intellect is good directed to operation, and 
under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the 
speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation» 18.
While the speculative intellect is ordered simply to the consideration 
of truth, practical knowledge adds a further ordination toward operation. Inas-
much as the practical intellect knows truth «just as the speculative» but is dis-
tinct from the speculative only in «directing the known truth to operation», 
it would appear that the notion of a truth foundationally separated from prior 
speculative adequatio is alien to the thought of Aquinas: a contradiction in 
terms. Moreover, it is exclusively the rational intent to direct the known truth 
to operation that causes the accident (vis-à-vis truth as such) of some knowl-
edge being practical. One notes on this score –ensconced in a treatment of 
art–, Thomas’s cognate observation in De veritate q. 2, a. 8, ..., r.:
«But the knowledge that an artist has about something that can be made 
is of two kinds: speculative and practical. He has speculative or theoretical 
knowledge when he knows the intimate nature of a work but does not have 
the intention of applying the principles to the production of the work. His 
knowledge is practical, properly speaking, when by his intention he ordains 
the principles of the work to operation as an end. In this way, as Avicenna 
says, medicine is divided into theoretical and practical. It is clear that the 
practical knowledge of an artist follows his speculative knowledge, since it is made 
practical by applying the speculative to a work. But when the practical is absent, the 
speculative remains [emphasis added]» 19.
17 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, op. cit., q. 79, a. 11: «Accidit autem alicui apprehen-
so per intellectum, quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt 
intellectus speculativus et practicus. Nam intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non 
ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem: practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui 
hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus».
18 Ibid., ad. 2: «ita obiectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri. Intellec-
tus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit sicut speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus».
19 aquinas, st. thomas, De veritate, Leonino 1970 edito ex plagulis de prelo emendatum ac trans-
latum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instru-
xit, CorpusThomisticum, https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdv02.html#52023, q. 2, a. 8, ... r.: 
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These remarks manifest St. Thomas’s judgment that practical knowledge 
always presupposes this underlying speculative element and follows from it: 
precisely the point at issue with respect to Finnis’s construction of the distinc-
tion between the speculative and the practical.
There is a danger of forgetting that the capacity of a rational consideration 
to bear essentially upon action and the ordination of contingent means to ends 
– its objectively practical nature – presupposes a prior speculative knowledge 
whose extension to action is necessary and constitutive for the formation of 
practical knowledge 20. That a certain proposition refer essentially to operation 
simply concerns the content of the proposition: but that it be able to refer es-
sentially to operation depends on prior adequatio regarding the nature of the 
end that is prior to appetition and intention. It is here that I am indebted to 
the writing of Fr. Serge-Tomas Bonino, a Dominican philosopher whose work 
I highly regard. While the conclusions in his remarks vary from my own, his 
formulation has made even more acutely visible to me the multifaceted difficul-
ty that resides in this crucial consideration. I would add that it is my sense that 
Bonino’s articulates in more express Thomistic terms the nature of the difficulty 
that moves Finnis to his analysis, and which he has articulated both in Natural 
Law and Natural Rights and in other work expanding upon his original analysis. 
Hence I will introduce Bonino’s formulation, move back to Finnis, and offer 
response. In footnote #21 in his essay «Charisms, Forms and States of Life» in 
the volume The Ethics of Aquinas edited by Stephen Pope 21 Fr. Bonino writes:
«Sed sciendum, quod artifex de operabili habet duplicem cognitionem: scilicet speculativam et 
practicam. Speculativam quidem, sive theoricam cognitionem habet, cum rationes operis cog-
noscit sine hoc quod ad operandum per intentionem applicet; sed tunc proprie habet practicam 
cognitionem quando extendit per intentionem rationes operis ad operationis finem; et secundum 
hoc medicina dividitur in theoricam et practicam, ut Avicenna dicit. Ex quo patet quod cognitio 
artificis practica sequitur cognitionem eius speculativam, cum practica efficiatur per extensionem 
speculativae ad opus. Remoto autem posteriori remanet prius». 
20 DeWan, L., «St. Thomas, Our Natural Lights, and the Moral Order», Angelicum, vol. 67, 1990, 
pp. 283-307. As he puts it: «Can there be any doubt that for St. Thomas the knowledge of the 
one (‘the good’) derives from the knowledge of the other (‘a being’)? St. Thomas teaches, in 
Summa Theologiae, op. cit., I-II, q. 9, art. 1, that the practical intellect has its priority with respect 
to the will, as mover of the will, precisely inasmuch as its (the intellect’s) vision of ‘the good’ 
flows from its vision of ‘a being’ and ‘the true’. The practical intellect views goodness under the 
aspect of being and truth, sees what goodness is. If goodness were not being viewed under the 
aspect of being, it would not be being ‘understood’ at all».
21 bonino, S-T., «Charisms, Forms, and States of Life», tr. Noble, M.T., O.P., pp. 340-352, The 
Ethics of Aquinas, Pope, S.J. (ed.), Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C, 2002, foot-
note #21, p. 350.
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«Speculative and practical knowledge are distinguished by their ends. But 
it is important to understand clearly that practical knowledge is not, as is often 
imagined, an initially speculative knowledge that has become practical becau-
se a person wants to apply it, of his free choice, to action. People imagine that 
there is some kind of undifferentiated knowledge which, at the person’s choi-
ce, remains speculative or becomes practical. In this case, when it is affirmed 
that practical and speculative knowledge are distinguished according to their 
ends, it is a question of a finality extrinsic to knowledge: the finis operantis, that 
is, the end sought by the person in his or her knowing. But this is not the case. 
Speculative and practical knowledge are in reality distinguished by the finis 
operis, that is, the finality intrinsic to the knowledge. It is as the knowledge 
stands in itself, and not in virtue of some superadded intention, that practical 
knowledge differs from speculative knowledge. The speculative knowledge of 
a house (which consists in knowing the quiddity of the house, its essence) is, 
therefore, not the same thing as the practical knowledge of the house (which 
consists in knowing the house as something that is to be built). The principle 
of this practical knowledge is not the essence of the house, but the end of the 
house, and a person reasons in order to know by what means and through 
what steps this end may be attained concretely. On this question, vid., Marie-
Michel Labourdette, ‘note sur les diversifications du savoir: connaissance spé-
culative et connaissance pratique’ (Revue Thomiste 44, 1938, 564-68)».
These remarks are, to me, of remarkable interest and richness, and while 
not denying the distinction in terms of mode, argues for the greater funda-
mentality of the distinction predicated on the «what» that is known. Howev-
er, I wish to suggest difficulties. First, his remarks acknowledge that there is 
indeed a consideration of speculative and practical according to the end for 
the sake of which the knowledge occurs. That is, as Thomas clearly writes in 
Summa Theologiae 22, one may know either for the sake simply of knowing – a 
speculative mode of knowing – or for the sake of the good of an operation – 
practical knowledge. This sense of the distinction between speculative and 
practical is focused on the mode of the knowing as such, and not simply on the 
nature of that which is known: because one may know truths about contingent 
matters ordered to some good end without intending any operation or seeking 
to know what one knows precisely for the good of an operation (even when 
what is known by its nature may indeed bear directly on the good of opera-
22 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, op. cit., I-I, q. 79, a. 11.
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tion). Thus, one might study ethics simply to contemplate the structure of the 
good for man, something of practical concern but which one might consider 
apart from any particular desire or intention to act. Similarly, someone doing 
publicity for the local math club might need to learn enough about «Pi» to 
understand why it was being celebrated by the math club and to publicize it 
intelligently: knowing a truth of its nature speculative (about the nature of Pi) 
for the sake of the good of an operation (publicizing the celebration of Pi by 
the local math club), a practical mode of knowing.
But it is here that Fr. Bonino enjoins against the idea of «some kind of 
undifferentiated knowledge, which, at the person’s choice, remains specula-
tive or becomes practical». This would be, he argues, a finality «extrinsic to 
knowledge: the finis operantis, that is, the end sought by the person in his or 
her knowing» rather than the finis operis that formally concerns the nature of 
the object known. But he states that this specification of the practical by some-
thing extrinsic to knowledge «is not the case». Rather, he argues, speculative 
and practical knowledge are in reality distinguished by the finis operis, that is, 
the finality intrinsic to the knowledge». He continues: «It is as the knowledge 
stands in itself, and not in virtue of some superadded intention, that practical 
knowledge differs from speculative knowledge».
In an argument that calls to mind Bonino’s comparison of the diverse 
senses of the speculative/practical distinction, further amplifying the analysis 
of Natural Law and Natural Rights in his work Aquinas, Finnis writes:
«Some commentators on Aquinas have imagined that they are such pro-
positions, on which a ‘practical’, i.e., directive, character is conferred by the 
intervention of some act of will. Such a view not only contradicts Aqui-
nas’ conception of the first practical principles as ‘founded on’ an absolutely 
first practical principle whose form – the form which makes every practical 
principle and proposition practical – is neither indicative nor imperative, but 
gerundive and directive. It also hopelessly contradicts his basic and pervasive 
understanding of will – that it is response to reasons. Practical intelligence is 
not slave to the will any more than it is the slave of the passions» 23.
It is here that the crux of the difficulty resides. As already observed, the 
distinction between speculative and practical can be made in two distinct 
but interrelated senses. One sense concerns the nature of the «what» that is 
23 Finnis, J., Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, Aquinas, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
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known, and the other concerns that for the sake of which the knowledge occurs, 
the end of the knowing as specifying the act of the intellect itself. The first 
is simple, in that what is known either is necessary and perhaps eternal, or 
is a contingent matter ordered or orderable for the sake of the good of an operation 
and the attainment of some end. Yet (as here listed) the second sense of the 
distinction regards the intellectual mode in which what is known is known, 
and it pertains to the knowledge qua knowledge rather than directly to that 
which the knowledge is about (since what is practical in the first sense may 
be speculative in the second).This second sense concerns whether the agent 
seeks simply to know – speculative knowledge – or whether instead the agent 
orders the knowledge precisely for the sake of the good of an operation he intends to 
perform – practical knowledge. Knowledge of something essentially practical 
in the earlier and first sense articulated above – knowledge of contingent 
means in relation to an end – may be pursued by someone who does not seek 
this knowledge for the sake of acting, but simply to perfect his understand-
ing. In this case the thing known is practical, but the nature of the agent’s 
knowing most surely is not, because this act of knowing precisely as an act 
of knowing is not undertaken for any practical purpose but only to perfect 
the understanding.
Fr. Bonino does not deny that the distinction of mode is a significant 
distinction, but with great penetration observes that it concerns the finis op-
erantis rather than the finis operis. He writes that «Speculative and practical 
knowledge are in reality distinguished by the finis operis». I take Finnis to 
mean something akin to this, in his above-cited view that were speculative 
and practical distinguished by their ends 24, practical intelligence would lose its 
distinctive character and become a mere «slave of the passions» – although, 
unlike Bonino 25. I am unaware of any express acknowledgement on his part 
that Thomas’s observations in Summa Theologiae (op. cit., I-I, q. 79, a. 11) have 
implications for the genesis of our moral knowledge. Finnis does articulate 
something that bears some similarity to Thomas’s teaching of the two senses 
of the speculative/practical distinction, but it is significantly differently ex-
pressed and makes no reference to Thomas’s express teaching or any implica-
24 As St. Thomas Aquinas argues in Summa Theologiae, op. cit., I-I, q. 79, art. 11. 
25 Thus, while Bonino’s immediate resolution of the question seems to me in need of revision, his 
account need not embrace the wider negation of the pertinence of the speculative as informing 
the practical, arguably precisely because he does not wish to negate the validity of Summa Theo-
logiae, op. cit., I-I, q. 79, a. 11.
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tions of that teaching for the genesis of moral action 26. If by «speculative» and 
«practical» we refer to the what that is known, it is incontrovertible that this 
is a function of the finis operis. But if one is speaking of the mode of the knowing 
as such, this formulation is difficult to affirm.
Why is the mode of knowing important? The mode of the knowing is 
important because, prior to any intention to act, there is not a practical mode of 
knowing, there is simply speculative knowledge. We may know what is practical in 
the sense of being concerned with the order of contingent means to objects of 
desire and intention, but prior to desire and intention our knowledge as knowl-
edge is not yet practically determined. Desire is prior to practical intention, and 
before there can be desire or intention there must be knowledge. Accordingly, 
precisely as knowledge, irrespective its object, this knowledge is necessarily 
speculative in its mode. It is also for this reason that synderesis, which of itself 
does not entirely commit to a particular action absent further considerations, 
is speculative knowledge which principiates, serves as the moving principle 
for, practical considerations. It is thus teleologically practical by its nature, but 
viewed precisively and in terms of the mode of the knowledge, it is origina-
tively speculative.
Which is the more fundamental sense of the speculative/practical distinction? 
Without intention to act, there would never exist any «practical» objects or 
subject matter: if human persons have or can have no desire or intention, then 
there can be no «what» which is the nature of the human practical act (for on 
26 There is a consideration in Natural Law and Natural Rights that approaches Thomas’s distinction 
of the speculative from the practical mode of knowing, but it makes no reference to Thomas’s 
teaching, and speaks of what would need to be seen as the «practical» mode of knowing as being 
«instrumental» – which indeed, it truly is, but of course, not in any way that suggests reducing 
the moral good to mere instrumentality which the language might suggest (hence Finnis’s com-
ment in his later work, Aquinas, that seems to treat the modal distinction as equivalent to prac-
tical intelligence being «slave to the will»). For Thomas the practical intellect knows truth just 
as the speculative, but ordains the known truth to the good of an operation. Not to the (mere?) 
good of «instrumentality» but to the good of an operation. Similarly, the desire for truth as such 
ought not be reduced to the effect of «curiosity» – something that is plausibly thought of in cer-
tain contexts as a vice, but which even when not a vice is not something to which all knowledge 
speculative in its mode is inexpugnably connected. Here are the lines, from p. 60: «... the dis-
tinction I am drawing is not between one set of propositions and another. It is not a distinction 
between fields of knowledge. Any proposition, whatever its subject-matter, can be inquired into 
(with a view to affirming or denying it) in either of two distinct ways, (i)instrumentally, or (2) 
out of curiosity, the pure desire to know, to find out the truth about it simply out of an interest 
in or concern for truth and a desire to avoid ignorance or error as such». There is no express 
engagement with Thomas’s teaching from Summa Theologiae, I, op. cit., q. 79, a. 11.
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that supposition there will be no human practical act, nor any human practi-
cal reasoning). Because prior to knowledge that is speculative in its mode the 
knowledge that is practical in its mode is objectively impossible – and because 
knowledge practical in its mode is absolutely required if there is even to exist 
any human practical knowledge in the sense of the knowledge specified by 
the practical nature of that which is known, of the «what» to be known; it 
follows that the modality of knowledge is the more foundational sense of the 
distinction.
Knowledge speculative in its mode does not necessarily presuppose knowledge 
practical in its mode, but rather the reverse, and knowledge practical in its object is 
derived from knowledge practical in its mode. If no knowledge practical in its mode 
exists, no practical human agency is possible since such agency requires voluntariness, 
and the result would be the nonexistence of the practical object in terms of the finis 
operis. In the absence of practical human agency, there will be no essentially practical 
object. It follows that a practical object underived from prior speculative cognition is 
an impossibility. This conclusion involves no derogation of the distinctive field 
of intellectual operation constituted by deliberation and reasoning about con-
tingent means in relation to ends. Knowledge further ordained to operation is 
practical, and study of that which concerns ordination to operation is study of 
what is practical by its nature. But that which is practical by its nature implies the 
possibility of knowledge practical in its mode, which absolutely requires prior 
speculative knowledge and is derived from it precisely because it is something 
first known (prior to appetition of it) that moves the will. As I have argued 
elsewhere (cfr. note #31 below), speculative knowledge of the end that ordains 
is objectively prior to knowledge of the end as ordaining (and this is true even 
when the first is simultaneous with the second, because the first is objectively 
the sine qua non of the second).
But is not speculative knowledge then merely «modally» but not objec-
tively prior to the practical? Since all objects are originatively speculative in 
the most foundational sense of the distinction between the speculative and the 
practical, the answer is that the «what» to be known – no matter its charac-
ter – is always and necessarily first speculatively known. Speculative knowing 
precedes appetition and intention; practical knowing for the sake of the good 
of an operation presupposes such speculative knowledge, and practical human 
agency absolutely presupposes practical knowing for the sake of the good of 
an operation (a knowledge which can never exist apart from prior speculative 
knowledge). The entire realm of practical cognition and agency (and every in-
stance of these) is thus necessarily derived from prior speculative knowledge. 
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This constitutes an absolute objective priority of speculative truth vis-à-vis 
practical reason. Contrary to the assertion that the practical is underived from spec-
ulative truth, the entire practical realm – every practical knowledge, and every prac-
tical human agency – can only exist as derived from prior speculative knowledge.
It follows that the foundational sense of the distinction of speculative and 
practical is that in terms of the teleology of knowing. Speculative and practical 
knowledge are distinguished by their ends. In this light, to say that what by its 
nature is something practical cannot be known speculatively appears similar to the 
view according to which it is impossible to know material things through an 
immaterial act of knowledge in an abstracted concept, a judgment that expects 
what characterizes the mode of knowledge necessarily to be what characterizes that 
which the knowledge is about. It belongs to the nature of the intellect to possess 
in an immaterial way the cognition of quiddity in corporeal matter 27. Likewise 
it belongs to the intellect to possess speculative knowledge even of practical 
things insofar as these are known not (or certainly not initially and also not 
exclusively) for the purpose of guiding action, but either as initiating our con-
tact with potentially appetible objects or for the purpose of understanding the 
nature of moral action or the structure of the created natural good. If we refer 
27 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, op. cit., q. 84, a. 7, c: «intellectus autem humani, qui 
est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali exis-
tens». And from the commentary on Boethius’s De trinitate, Bruno Decker Lugduni Batauorum 
1959 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit 
Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit, made available online by the University of Navarre, https://
www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html, q. 5, a. 2, c: «Et ideo formae et rationes rerum qua-
mvis in motu exsistentium, prout in se considerantur, absque motu sunt. Et sic de eis sunt scien-
tiae et diffinitiones... Possunt ergo huiusmodi rationes sic abstractae considerari dupliciter. Uno 
modo secundum se, et sic considerantur sine motu et materia signata, et hoc non invenitur in eis 
nisi secundum esse quod habent in intellectu. Alio modo secundum quod comparantur ad res, 
quarum sunt rationes; quae quidem res sunt in materia et motu. Et sic sunt principia cognoscen-
di illa, quia omnis res cognoscitur per suam formam. Et ita per huiusmodi rationes immobiles et 
sine materia particulari consideratas habetur cognitio in scientia naturali de rebus mobilibus et 
materialibus extra animam exsistentibus».  –  «... forms and natures, though belonging to things 
existing in motion, are without motion when they are considered in themselves; and so they 
can be the objects of sciences and of definitions... Natures of this sort, thus abstracted, can be 
considered in two ways. First, in themselves; and then they are thought of without motion and 
determinate matter. This happens to them only by reason of the being they have in the intellect. 
Second, they can be viewed in relation to the things of which they are the natures; and these 
things exist with matter and motion. Thus they are principles by which we know these things, 
for everything is known through its form. Consequently, in natural science we know mutable 
and material things existing outside the soul through natures of this kind; that is to say, natures 
that are immobile and considered without particular matter».
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to the study of a subject it is specified by that subject; if we refer to the way a 
subject is known, it is specified by the mode of knowing.
It is accidental to the good that is known that I am ordered or orderable 
to it: something most clear in the case of God, but true of ends as such. The 
perfectible is for the sake of the perfect: not the other way around. God does 
not exist for me, but I am ordered to God. It is not essential to the very perfection 
itself to which I am ordered that I am ordered to it. Wisdom does not pine for 
me, water does not wait expectantly upon my thirst, patience does not calmly 
but expectantly await me 28. This does not make the human ordering to the 
good arbitrary, however, because it is not accidental but essential to the nature 
of the human person to be ordered to certain goods, as potency is ordered to 
act, and as the perfectible is ordered to the perfect. While it may be accidental 
to what is known that it incite desire, it is not accidental to human nature that 
knowing the nature of certain perfections the agent is naturally ordered to be 
perfected in seeking and attaining them and can see the perfective character 
of the end known 29. Do we first reason to the ordination of intellect to its end 
28 Granted that something is understood to be good insofar as something flows from it, this does 
not mean either that the good necessarily flows from something else or that it must communi-
cate externally: both flowing from something else, and necessary real relation to what is exter-
nal, signify limitations of potency, and the ratio of good may but need not imply potency. Hence 
the Summa Theologiae, op. cit., I-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad. 1: «Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de ratione 
boni est quod aliquid ab ipso effluat, non tamen quod ipsum ab alio procedat»: «the very nature 
of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else». But Summa 
Theologiae, op. cit., I-II, q. 5, a. 4, ad. 2, states: «Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum dicitur 
diffusivum sui esse, eo modo quo finis dicitur movere».: «goodness is described as self-diffusive 
in the sense that an end is said to move». To move, not to be moved, the former implying no po-
tency insofar as what is in question is perfection (and to the degree something lacks perfection, 
it is just so far, an inferior end).
29 Dietrich von Hildebrand holds a similar rejection of the transcendence and perfective char-
acter of Aristotelian and Thomistic accounts of normative unified teleology in the moral life, 
although Finnis’s reasons are epistemic whereas von Hildebrand seems to suggest that teleology 
is simply an appetitive solipsism un-normed by any perfective good. Von Hildebrand’s Christian 
Ethics, David McKay Company, New York, 1953, pp. 95 and 186, and Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 33-34. Unlike Finnis, Hildebrand’s rejection of teleological ethics 
rests upon a psychologization and immanentization of teleology (Christian Ethics, pp. 95-100; 
pp. 186-190). He argues that in teleological ethics the character of the end as good means 
«nothing more than the fact that this act is suitable for the unfolding of the entelechy of the 
man» who performs the good act. So, von Hildebrand failed to discern the transcendent aspect 
of natural finality within teleological ethics as that for the sake of which a thing is and acts. Com-
pare this with St. Thomas’s view of teleology (Summa Theologiae, I-II, op. cit., q. 2, a. 5): «... man 
is ordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore, the last end 
of man’s reason and will cannot be the preservation of man’s being». Thomistic teleology stress-
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– truth – or do we first know something because the intellect is ordered to truth 
and thereafter derive the befitting judgment regarding its end? We may later 
make the quest for truth thematic in our lives, but this presupposes the prior 
teleological ordering of mind to the true which is indeed a natural teleological 
ordering: nature is never, teleologically speaking, in «neutral gear».
There is here, in the relation of finis operantis to the finis operis a distinc-
tion of great importance. One does not deny the nature of the finis operis – of 
the nature of the what that is known – in observing that the end for the sake 
of which the agent knows will determine whether the agent is knowing to act, 
or is simply knowing. Prior to any knowledge that is practical in the sense of 
being achieved for the sake of acting there is knowing for the sake of knowing, 
because acting is governed by knowing, and indeed, desire and intention pre-
suppose prior knowledge that transcends the practical order while yet it is the 
principle of it 30.
At the very basis of the practical there is thus necessarily a «derivation» 
of intention from a knowledge prior to desire and prior to intention. Every 
es the transcendent good and the ordering character of the end, while nonetheless insisting that 
precisely as the good for the sake of which man is, man is immanently ordered to God. Indeed, 
were man not ordered to his end, it is unclear what it would mean to assert that this end was that 
for the sake of which he is and acts. Nor, contra Hildebrand, is this «selfish» – precisely because 
the human person is ordained to common goods, and ultimately to the supreme extrinsic common 
good of the universe, God, who is not merely a «private» good. Human teleology is not, as Hil-
debrand accuses Aristotle and others of holding, merely akin to the homeostasis of the animal 
eating and drinking to satiation. But then, post-enlightenment thought can only think of goods 
as lower goods, and so must contrast this with a «pure duty» somehow untethered from nobler 
ends. But duty unjustified by the nobility of the end and the order to it seems to this author to 
constitute the loss of the transcendence of the good: deontology designates at its best a minima 
natura required for motion toward the good rather than the full glory of perfection.
30 The sense of the distinction between speculative and practical identified with the finis operis 
concerns, I have argued, the nature of the what that one is knowing. The second sense concerns 
the end for the sake of which one is knowing. We have here, once again, the relation of object 
to end that arises also with respect to the understanding of the analysis of human action. And 
the end specifies actions, and indeed, without a finis operantis there is no finis operis because on 
that supposition there will never be a cognitive operation. Every practical object ordained to 
operation of its very nature is (in the modal sense of the distinction of the speculative and the 
practical articulated by Thomas in Summa Theologiae, I, op. cit., q. 79, a. 11) known first specula-
tively, because what is sought as a good must first somehow be known if there is to be desire and 
intention. Moreover, one may act practically in behalf of all kinds of things, including things 
that are not properly operables. The dead are not «operables», but one may make the life of an 
ancestor a model for one’s own practical imitation. God is not an «operable» but one may order 
one’s actions entirely for the sake of achieving natural wisdom regarding God or, further, the 
beatific vision, both of which seem to be – as Aquinas teaches – speculative and contemplative.
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practical knowing presupposes such foundationally speculative knowing. In-
deed, the convertibility of being, true, and good guarantee that anything that 
is known could be such as to orchestrate practical intentions. What guarantees the 
integrity of the practical in the first sense – the practical «by nature» as some-
thing ordered or orderable to an end – is the actual teleological order whereby 
human nature is ordained to certain perfections as potency is ordained to act, 
and as the perfectible is ordained to the perfect. It is not that these perfections 
are themselves somehow simply «practical». Food, water, friendship, wisdom, 
holiness, all can be objects of either speculative or practical cognition, but the 
ordering of contingent means to them is practical by nature even when known 
in a merely speculative manner. There is no question of denying that nature 
is ordered to perfections, but only of realizing that the perfections are not in and 
of themselves ordered to our nature but rather the converse. The pros hen structure 
of the practical life presupposes speculative adequatio. If an agent knows noth-
ing, the nonexistent knowledge cannot elicit desire and intention ordaining 
the agent to anything, and the needed cognition is prior to practical orches-
trations 31. How then does practical operation occur? There truly are ends, 
31 Pertinent here is my extensive footnote #7 in «Teleology, Divine Governance, and the Common 
Good –  Reflections on the ITC’s The Search for Universal Ethics: A New Look at Natural Law», 
Nova et Vetera, English Edition, vol. 9, n. 3, 2011, pp. 775–789. I quote: «On this score, one 
must observe that even reason is teleologically ordained to its end prior to any act of reason: 
teleological order is the formal precondition of efficiency. There can be a tendency to suppose 
that, because man moves toward his end as specified by reason, that therefore his inclinational 
ordering is a pure function of understanding. Whereas, reason itself is ordained to the true prior 
to the understanding that reason is ordained to the true; and, further and more specifically, that 
understanding inform, incite, and specify volition is a function of the teleological ordering of 
human nature as a whole (granted, under the form of reason). One understands that water is 
good for one, but knowledge of one’s own thirst plays a role in this understanding. This does 
not mean that lower inclination trumps reason, but that reason discriminates the ordering in 
lower inclinations and so moves us to a genuinely rational appetite with respect to their objects, 
placing these in relation to the whole universe of good. Yet that I am such a being as, ensuing 
upon knowledge of a good, to be incited to desire for it, is a function of my entire nature and 
its teleology, and not merely of reason: granted that there must be rational apprehension of the 
good in order for one’s will to be moved by it and toward it (which involves also the rational 
grasp of one’s own subrational appetites and their objects in relation to the order of ends). For 
example, to say no more, such volition presupposes the general natural rational volition of the 
end – of the good in general, happiness – which is prior to further specification of the desire for 
happiness. Act is prior to potency, absolutely speaking. And to know the good precisely as object 
of desire – under that ratio – one must first know the good, and be moved to desire it. Hence 
our understanding of the objective good that ordains is distinct from our understanding of the 
objective good precisely as ordaining, for the first is prior to the motion of the will, while the 
latter is subsequent. The knowledge of the good for man precisely as such includes reference to 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEGATION OF THE OBJECTIVE PRIORITY...
PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 82 / 2020/1 121
reasons for action, to which human nature as such is naturally ordered, and 
this teleological ordering is real and effectual, although its full unfolding and 
implications are susceptible «downstream» to human defect. The ordering 
of human nature as specified by the order of ends is not defective, but human 
intention and choice may be. The foundational role of the speculative in rela-
tion to the engendering of the realm of practical agency tout cour is mirrored 
in Thomas’s explanation highlighting both the similarity of end to circumstance, 
and the difference. In a sense the end is like a circumstance, because it is ex-
trinsic to the act. Yet, as Thomas explains, «to the second it should be said that 
while the end is an extrinsic cause, still due proportion to the end and relation 
the motion of the will, because the good for man implies the ordering of man to something as an 
end, and potency is known only in relation to act: this is to say that the perfection of the end is 
thus known as terminating a motio, as activating a potency, even though in relation to act as such 
potency is accidental, because potency is for the sake of act and is defined by it. Although action 
is essentially ordained to end, it is accidental simply to the perfection specified by «end» that it 
be terminus of the act: the end is an extrinsic cause, as Thomas teaches (Summa Theologiae, I-II, 
op. cit., q. 7, a. 3, r.; also q. 7, a. 4, ad. 2), even while it is «the most important cause of the act 
insofar as it moves the agent to act» (ibid., a. 4, ad. 2: «Ad secun- dum dicendum quod finis, etsi 
non sit de substantia actus, est tamen causa actus principalissima, inquantum movet ad agen-
dum. Unde et maxime actus moralis speciem habet ex fine»). The notion of the good for man 
includes the attainment of that good through the motion of the will – this is the very reason why 
Thomas distinguishes our attainment of happiness and the reality in which happiness consists 
as both pertaining to beatitude. Yet it is potency that is ordered to act and not the converse, and so our 
knowledge of some perfection can rationally direct the will  – we judge something worthy of desire; 
whereas it is only following upon actual inclination that reflexive knowledge of the good as perfecting 
appetite occurs. In a way similar to that in which, because one knows, one knows oneself to be a 
knower, so likewise because one is volitionally moved by rational apprehension of the nature of 
the good, one knows oneself to be ordered to the good. Even if it be said that the knowledge of 
the good for man requires only the knowledge of something as potentially moving the will, the 
understanding of this potential motion can occur only on the basis of prior knowledge of act, 
because potency is knowable only in relation to act. To know the will as potentially moveable 
relative to a judgment of reason about being as perfective seems to require prior knowledge of 
the will as actually moveable, which is to say of the good as actually moving the will; and for that 
prior knowledge to occur, we must have known something about being, some objective aspect of 
a thing that actually incited appetite: the will must have been moved. Hence in our knowledge 
of the good, there is a first utterly speculative moment wherein our knowledge/judgment of 
being forms, specifies, defines, and attracts the motion of the will – the known object ordains such 
motion, as it were. Thereupon we reflexively know the rationally apprehended reality precisely 
under the formality of its attraction of the will’s motion – not merely the good (that ordains), 
but precisely the good as ordaining. Because of the universal extension of teleology as the very 
condition of all efficiency, it is important not to overstate the efficiency of reason with respect 
to the motion of the will: the reason informs and specifies the will, but it is of the nature of man 
that the teleological ordering of his nature be such that certain known goods rationally attract».
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to it are inherent to the action» 32. The first knowledge of the end prior to de-
sire, intention, and agency is clearly the font of desire, intention, and agency. 
And the due proportion and relation of practical agency to the speculative 
knowing of that to which human nature is ordained is the conditio sine qua non 
of desire, intention, and agency to which such desire and intention always and 
intrinsically maintain a due proportion and relation.
Because the human person is homo sapiens, our knowledge of that which 
exists is always prior to, and the condition for, any practical knowledge or rea-
soning and from which these derive. There is a prior speculum from which any 
and every practical intention is teleologically derivative. It is accidental to the 
grain of sand around which the pearl forms that the pearl forms around it, but 
it is not accidental to the pearl that it should form around the sand. Similarly, 
it is accidental to the speculative knowledge prior to desire and intention that 
these be elicited and ordered with respect to it: but it is not accidental to hu-
man nature to be so ordered. Teleological ordering is the conditio sine qua non 
of operation as such. This ought to surprise no one.
iii. CasCaDing imPliCations
The immediate effect of the negation of the formal and objective primacy 
of the speculative in Natural Law and Natural Rights is the negation of unified 
natural teleology as definitive for the practical life. Separating practical reason 
from the primary teleological ordering of the human mind to speculative truth, 
it will prove difficult to restore the principle at a subordinate level. It is not sim-
ply that Finnis with commendably consistent systematic rigor discerns and holds 
this implication, as he does, but rather (as he sees) that it is an inescapable entail-
ment of his analysis. On the account of Natural Law and Natural Rights, natural 
teleology may be understood in metaphysics or philosophy of nature as unified 
and permeating, but properly speaking his analysis requires that practical agen-
32 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I–II, op. cit., q. 18, a. 4, ad. 2: «Ad secundum dicendum 
quod, quamvis finis sit causa extrinseca, tamen debita proportio ad finem et relatio in ipsum, in-
haeret actioni». Vid., ibid., q. 1, art. 3, ad. 1: «Ad primum ergo dicendum quod finis non est omnino 
aliquid extrinsecum ab actu, quia comparatur ad actum ut principium vel terminus; et hoc ipsum 
est de ratione actus, ut scilicet sit ab aliquo, quantum ad actionem, et ut sit ad aliquid, quantum ad 
passionem». – «The end is not wholly extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as princi-
ple or terminus; and thus it is just this that is the nature of act, namely to proceed from something, 
considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion». 
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cy not only can, but must, prescind from the knowledge of unified teleological 
order, perhaps to be reunited with it later in a purely theoretic treatment of the 
matter. But to the contrary teleology is both speculative and practical even in 
the sense of «what the knowledge is about» – knowledge of that which by nature 
is perfective, to which our nature is in reality ordered, is a necessary condition 
of right action with respect to it 33: and that which is naturally perfective consti-
tutes a teleologically ordered whole that specifies wisdom regarding a good life. 
Further, some realities only naturally knowable through reasoning – God, the 
common good – play a central and very formal role in the moral life.
It illustrates this truth that certain ends to which we are in fact ordered – 
e.g., speculative natural wisdom regarding God – are only accessible through 
natural reasoning that is wholly speculative in both senses (both finis operantis 
and finis operis). This does not mean that such knowledge is the exclusive ven-
ue of theorists, because natural reasoning regarding God arises apart from the 
full theoretic development of philosophic proofs, just as natural logic is the 
condition for the development of logic in the fuller and formal sense of the 
term. But such knowledge impacts our immediate consideration with prac-
tical moral reasoning, because under the virtue of justice there are duties to 
God (religious duties). Clearly this can have no place in the zone bounded by 
the principles of Natural Law and Natural Rights, wherein an apprehension of 
theoretic reason cannot found a moral duty (but religion as a natural virtue 
presupposes natural knowledge of God) 34.
Finnis treats the foundational moral concern of unified natural teleology 
for practical life as merely a higher order theoretic observation from which 
33 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, op. cit., q. 19, a. 4, ad. 4: «In his autem quae sunt 
ad finem, rectitudo rationis consistit in conformitate ad appetitum finis debiti. Sed tamen et 
ipse appetitus finis debiti praesupponit rectam apprehensionem de fine, quae est per ratio-
nem».-«Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with 
the desire of a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of 
reason a right apprehension of the end».
34 Ibid., q. 81, a. 2 ad 3: «Ad tertium dicendum quod de dictamine rationis naturalis est quod 
homo aliqua faciat ad reverentiam divinam, sed quod haec determinate faciat vel illa, istud non 
est de dictamine rationis naturalis, sed de institutione iuris divini vel humani».«To the third it 
should be said that it belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something 
through reverence for God. But that he should do this or that determinate thing does not be-
long to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law». See also in the 
same question, a. 5, ad. 3: «Ad tertium dicendum quod religio non est virtus theologica neque 
intellectualis, sed moralis, cum sit pars iustitiae».: «to the third it should be said that religion is 
not a theological nor an intellectual but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice».
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no directive conclusion of moral agency derives. In Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, in a section titled «All Equally Fundamental», Finnis articulates the 
doctrine of the incommensurability/objective lack of «co-measurability» of 
goods denominated as basic: «each is fundamental. None is more fundamental 
than any of the others, for each can reasonably be focused upon, and each, 
when focused upon, claims a priority of value. Hence there is no objective pri-
ority amongst them» 35. One notes Finnis’s observation about these goods that 
«they are incommensurable» and his denial that there is any morally significant 
hierarchy of «basic» goods prior to choice. His evinced principal concern to 
avoid the utilitarian or consequentialist «calculative summing» of goods – from 
Benthamite hedon-counting to proportionalism – is of course sound 36. But the 
objective natural teleological commensuration of goods, their co-measuring as 
diverse rationes of the good closer to, or further from, the finis ultimus, is simply 
not considered. For Thomas this is impossible, for anything that is not desired 
as the finis ultimus is necessarily desired as ordered to it 37. Whether we speak 
simply of the good in general and happiness, or of that which constitutes the 
proportionate natural end (or even further of the last and supernatural end of 
beatitude, ordering nature through grace to the vision of God), unified tele-
ology is not a mere speculative icing added to the cake of morally disunified 
human ends, but constitutes it as the universe of good that it is 38.
As Finnis argues in Natural Law and Natural Rights:
«And thirdly, Aquinas himself was a writer not on ethics alone, but on 
the whole of theology. He was keen to show the relationship between his 
ethics of natural law and his general theory of metaphysics and the world-
35 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 93.
36 Ibid., pp. 112-118, especially p. 112 where speaking of goods denominated as basic, he writes 
«each of the basic aspects of human well-being is equally basic, that none is objectively more 
important than any of the others, and thus that none can provide a common denominator or sin-
gle yardstick for assessing the utility of all projects: they are incommensurable, and any calculus 
of consequences that pretends to commensurate them is irrational».
37 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, op. cit., I-II, q. 1, a. 6.
38 Of course, with respect to the further ordering of the person in grace, this is where the obedien-
tial potency of human nature to be so elevated enters the consideration: a further and profound 
consideration which, however, manifests the foundational level of the imago dei as chiefly found 
in the intellectual nature which under the divine active power is thus, by reason of its character as 
spirit, elevable to the beatific vision. Thus, there is both continuity – the intellectual nature – and 
also the transcendence of the order of grace, which last realizes infinitely more than could ever 
have been imagined by the creature in its general, inchoate, and imperfect natural desire for God 
(which last is nonetheless a sign of the fittingness of the human elevability by grace).
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order. He wished to point out the analogies running through the whole 
order of being. Thus human virtue is ‘analogous’ to the ‘virtue’ that can 
be predicated of anything that is a fine specimen of things of its nature, in 
good shape, bene disposita secundum convenientiam suae naturae. So he is happy 
to say that human virtue, too, is in accordance with the nature of human 
beings, and human vice is contra naturam. If we stopped here, the charge 
against him would seem to be proved, or at least plausible (and certain later 
philosophical theologians would seem to have been justified in claiming his 
patronage). But in fact Aquinas takes good care to make his meaning, his or-
der of explanatory priorities, quite clear. The criterion of conformity with, 
or contrariety to, human nature is reasonableness» 39.
He continues, after having quoted Thomas to the effect that «the good of 
human being is being in accord with reason, and human evil is being outside the order 
of reasonableness» 40 to argue that:
«In other words, for Aquinas, the way to discover what is morally right 
(virtue) and wrong (vice) is to ask, not what is in accordance with human 
nature, but what is reasonable. And this quest will eventually bring one back 
to the underived first principles of practical reasonableness, principles which 
make no reference at all to human nature, but only to human good» 41.
Principles «which make no reference at all to human nature» – something 
which one might seriously suppouse to be impossible since neither practical 
understanding of, nor human motion toward the good can lack all reference to 
human nature. Certainly Thomas did not suppose such a thing when writing: 
«Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum naturalium, est ordo praeceptorum legis 
naturae» 42. The moral significance of the proportion betwixt end and nature, 
and the unity of nature itself, are lost with the bracketing of unified moral 
teleology as a mere extrinsic theoretic addendum to the practical life. This 
seems to be a necessary casualty of the doctrine of the incommensurability 
of basic – not merely useful – human goods, that is, the doctrine that prior to 
39 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 35.
40 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, op. cit., q. 71, a. 2, r.
41 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 36.
42 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, op. cit., q. 94, a. 2, r.: «Thus according to the 
order of natural inclinations is the order of the precepts of the natural law». Order not list: the 
clear suggestion is not that the order is merely logical but rather natural.
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choice these goods/ends are not naturally ordered in any morally significant 
way 43. Reasonableness for Thomas is a function of reason; the good of reason 
is truth, adequatio intellectus et rei; and the truth in question in ethics concerns 
what is actually perfective (good) for human nature. Because ends are precise-
ly perfections for human agency and human nature, the effort to dissociate 
the unity of human nature from what is perfective for it – from unified natural 
teleology – places a significant cognitive disability at the core of one’s ethical 
consideration. Is practical reason «self-norming» or is it norming only insofar 
as adequated to the universe of what is naturally good? To say that the good of 
a human being is in accord with reason does not suggest that merely any act of 
reason is sufficient to direct one well to action. Reason must accord with the 
truth of the nature of the good, and so this must first be known. One recalls 
the observation of Thomas:
«Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles im-
pressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating 
to human conduct, of which the natural reason is the rule and measure, 
although it is not the measure of things that are from nature» 44.
Human reason is a «measured measure» – it must receive from nature 
the measure which it applies, it does not originate it ex nihilo, but through con-
forming to the principles impressed on it by nature it can then serve fittingly 
as the rule and measure of conduct (but not as the measure of things that are 
from nature, which rather measure reason).
Thomas’s analysis in Summa Theologiae, remains probative:
«Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended 
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is 
‘being,’ the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man ap-
prehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that ‘the same 
thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,’ which is based on 
the notion of ‘being’ and ‘not-being’: and on this principle all others are 
43 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp., 92-95.
44 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, op. cit., q. 91, a. 3, ad. 2: «Ad secundum dicen-
dum quod ratio humana secundum se non est regula rerum, sed principia ei naturaliter indita, 
sunt quaedam regulae generales et mensurae omnium eorum quae sunt per hominem agenda, 
quorum ratio naturalis est regula et mensura, licet non sit mensura eorum quae sunt a natura».
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based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as ‘being’ is the first thing 
that falls under the apprehension simply, so: good is the first thing that 
falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to 
action: since every agent acts for an end which has the nature of the good. 
Consequently, the first precept of practical reason is one founded on the 
notion of good, viz. that ‘good is that which all things seek after.’ Hence this 
is the first precept of law, that ‘good is to be done and pursued, and evil is 
to be avoided.’ All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so 
that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or 
evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or 
avoided» 45.
«The first indemonstrable principle is based on the notion of ‘being’ and 
‘not-being’: and on this principle all others are based». All others: practical 
principles included. Being is first in apprehension simply, so that all other 
principles are founded on it (ergo, separating knowledge practical in its mode 
from knowledge speculative in its mode would, absolutely speaking guaran-
tee the nonexistence of the practical) but good is first in the apprehension of 
practical reason which is directed to action (i.e., which already includes intention 
of an end, without which no human action as distinct from an act of man oc-
curs). Or, as Thomas says, good is first in the apprehension of practical reason 
because «every agent acts for an end that has the nature of the good». That 
is universal teleology: every agent acts for an end that has the nature of the good. 
Thus the first precept of law (primum princeptis legis) is founded «on the no-
tion of good» – an end – namely that good is to be done and pursued, and evil 
avoided. This teleological ordering to the good is universal and is the foun-
dation for the practical life, from which the first principle is indeed derived. 
45 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, op. cit., q. 94, a. 2, r.: «In his autem quae in appre-
hensione omnium cadunt, quidam ordo invenitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, 
est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit. Et ideo primum 
principium indemonstrabile est quod non est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra ra-
tionem entis et non entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. 
Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod 
cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus, omne enim agens agit propter 
finem, qui habet rationem boni. Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur 
supra rationem boni, quae est, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum 
legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur 
omnia alia praecepta legis naturae, ut scilicet omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecep-
ta legis naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana».
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Given Thomas’s manifest teaching everywhere in his corpus that inclinations 
are specified by their ends, his proposition (twice earlier cited above) in the 
same article that the order of precepts derives from the order of inclinations 
objectively implies that the order of inclinations is derived from the order of 
ends. It might be said that to «accord with» is not to «derive from» – but 
inclination requires prior knowledge that is speculative in its mode and from 
this knowledge derive knowledge of the end, appetition and intention (they 
can derive nowhere else). A certain order is normative here, descending from 
the speculative to the practical: as Thomas says: «The speculative intellect by 
extension becomes practical 46. The sense is not that from premises containing 
no reason for action, conclusions for action are drawn. Rather, the ordering of 
nature contains reasons for action – it is indeed true that there exist reasons for 
action, ends, to which human nature is ordained – and knowing these ends and 
their right order is essential to human flourishing.
Natural knowledge of God clearly is not purely practical, yet precepts 
pertaining to it form part of the natural law 47. God is not an operable, nor 
is God an a priori object of the will. Clearly speculative truth in this critical 
instance affects the living of a good life. But the same is true with respect 
to the nature and order of the family, about the objective nobility and com-
mands of the common good, or even about the nature of medical art as distinct 
from punishment or war. Before intention there is desire, and before desire, 
knowledge which accordingly is prior to and the font of practical life. A man’s 
glimpse of the woman with whom he falls in love – or for that matter, of the 
beckoning work of a lifetime – is simply speculative vision, but from it, owing 
to the ordering of human nature, derives desire and intention. Knowledge and 
experience of this complex weave yields an awareness of order which in turn 
becomes a principle regulating right judgment and conduct. Thomas is very 
far from denying that practical reason involves very distinctive challenges and 
cognitive considerations. But without extending speculative truth to practical 
operation, there is no humanly practical operation.
One of the prime speculative truths is that agency is, as such, teleological, 
because it is naturally ordained to bring something about. To act is to achieve 
something, either simply the act itself as an end – as when one simply wishes 
46 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, op. cit., q. 79, a. 11, s. c.: «Sed contra est quod 
dicitur in III de anima, quod intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus».
47 Ibid., q. 81, a. 5, ad. 3.
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to leave a crowded room – or some further end (as when one wishes to leave 
the crowded room for the sake of going to the store). Action as such is indis-
tinguishable from non-action save on the supposition of that which specifies 
it as the action it is, which is its end. Were goods not to be teleologically com-
mensurated, it would be questionable why they should be denominated good, 
or how one could escape Thomas’s observation that it is impossible for one 
mind to be ordered to diverse goods as final 48: i.e., there must be a governing 
teleological principle, an end. Goods constitute diverse rationes in an order ac-
cording to their proximity to the finis ultimus of human completion and flour-
ishing, such that they are more or less good (not quantitatively but intensively, 
by reason of their formal proximity to the finus ultimus of human flourishing). 
It is not that the order of goods in itself suffices to determine what to do hic 
et nunc, but rather that without knowledge of the order of goods, it would be 
unclear whether one were moving toward, or away from, a good life. But the 
second premise of moral reasoning will always be prudential in nature, taking 
stock of diverse capacities and circumstances.
Finnis’s proposition that goods denominated as basic rather than as use-
ful are incommensurable, objectively noncomparable with respect to their re-
spective rationes of good – such that there is no objective ordering of goods 
denominated basic prior to choice – seems necessary once the speculative 
awareness of objective natural teleology is excised from the account of practi-
cal moral reasoning itself. The apogee of this gravitational tendency appears 
in the necessary denial of the transcendence of the common good as an end. 
Prior to choice, the common good is a nobler and more rationally diffusive 
and perfective good – not merely the good «of many» but a good one in num-
ber (as an end) and of its nature communicable and diffusive, as justice is of its 
nature more communicable to many than is food which, if one eats it, another 
does not. This is so pronounced a teaching that for Thomas, all action to be 
good must be commensurated to the noblest common good which infinite-
ly precedes and exceeds all derivative common goods, namely, God. As St. 
Thomas expresses this in his Summa contra gentiles:
«Further, a particular good is ordered to the common good as to an end; 
indeed, the being of a part depends on the being of the whole. So, also, the 
good of a nation is more godlike than the good of one man. Now the supreme 
48 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, op. cit., q. 1, a. 5.
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good, namely God, is the common good, [my emphasis – SL] since the good of 
all things depends on him: and the good whereby each thing is good, is the 
particular good of that thing, and of those that depend thereon. Therefore, 
all things are directed to one good, namely, to God, as their end» 49.
And also, in the prima secundae of the Summa Theologiae:
«But a man’s will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he refer it 
to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite of each part is 
ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies 
the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end. Con-
sequently, in order that a man will some particular good with a right will, he 
must will that particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, 
formally. Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine 
will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and 
universal good» 50.
iV. the ContRibution oF natural law and natural rights
This paper has argued that the loss of prior speculative knowledge 
of the end (and the order of ends) from which both knowledge practical in 
its mode and the realm of practical agency as such derive, implies an ever 
widening circle of implications that endanger the realism and coherence of 
49 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa contra gentiles, III, Ch. 17, Corpus Thomisticum, S. Thomae de 
Aquino opera omnia, made available online by the University of Navarre, https://www.corpustho-
misticum.org/iopera.html, 1961 (26 September 2020): «Praeterea. Bonum particulare ordinatur 
in bonum commune sicut in finem: esse enim partis est propter esse totius; unde et bonum gen-
tis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Bonum autem summum, quod est Deus, est bonum 
commune, cum ex eo universorum bonum dependeat: bonum autem quo quaelibet res bona est, 
est bonum particulare ipsius et aliorum quae ab ipso dependent. Omnes igitur res ordinantur 
sicut in finem in unum bonum, quod est Deus».
50 aquinas, st. thomas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, op. cit., q. 19, a. 10: «Non est autem recta volun-
tas alicuius hominis volentis aliquod bonum particulare, nisi referat illud in bonum commune 
sicut in finem, cum etiam naturalis appetitus cuiuslibet partis ordinetur in bonum commune 
totius. Ex fine autem sumitur quasi formalis ratio volendi illud quod ad finem ordinatur. Unde 
ad hoc quod aliquis recta voluntate velit aliquod particulare bonum, oportet quod illud parti-
culare bonum sit volitum materialiter, bonum autem commune divinum sit volitum formaliter. 
Voluntas igitur humana tenetur confor- mari divinae voluntati in volito formaliter, tenetur enim 
velle bonum divinum et commune». 
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natural law reasoning. To trace these circles, or even begin to, however, re-
quires returning to the font of the difficulty. In wrestling with this question, 
and unfolding with rigorous systematic clarity the implications of his initial 
judgments, Finnis has performed a service to all who seek to understand 
these matters (and a service that only a rigorous and intelligent mind could 
perform). It is not simply a matter of the old jest – «perhaps the meaning of 
your life is to be a warning to others». Rather, it is that pursuing realist ob-
jectives 51 with great intensity and rational penetration will necessarily make 
conspicuous any error at the foundation of the edifice of one’s understanding 
of the natural law. Natural Law and Natural Rights has succeeded in turning 
the minds of many persons eager to discover what natural law is to the pro-
ject of attempting to understand it, and the account does not consist only 
in its deprivations or departures from Thomas’s teaching. But by reason of 
the goal it seeks with rigorous systematic consistency, its architectonic dep-
rivations become progressively more evident, and invite the mind to return 
to the sources: not merely in a historic sense (Thomas, Aristotle) but in the 
speculative sense of the return to what is fundamental and well articulated 
by these aforementioned preeminent minds. This is a contribution that is, in 
itself, an estimable –even basic– good 52.
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